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Abstract—We propose a method for detecting face swapping and other identity manipulations in single images. Face swapping
methods, such as DeepFake, manipulate the face region, aiming to adjust the face to the appearance of its context, while leaving the
context unchanged. We show that this modus operandi produces discrepancies between the two regions (e.g., Fig. 1). These
discrepancies offer exploitable telltale signs of manipulation. Our approach involves two networks: (i) a face identification network that
considers the face region bounded by a tight semantic segmentation, and (ii) a context recognition network that considers the face
context (e.g., hair, ears, neck). We describe a method which uses the recognition signals from our two networks to detect such
discrepancies, providing a complementary detection signal that improves conventional real vs. fake classifiers commonly used for
detecting fake images. Our method achieves state of the art results on the FaceForensics++, Celeb-DF-v2, and DFDC benchmarks for
face manipulation detection, and even generalizes to detect fakes produced by unseen methods.
Index Terms—Image Forensics, Deep Learning, Deep Fake, Face Swapping, Fake image Detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
P HOTOGRAPHY is widely perceived as offering authentic evi-dence of actual events, including, in particular, the presence
and actions of human subjects in images and videos. Although
this perception is slowly shifting, contemporary technology allows
far easier and more accessible manipulation of images than many
realize. This gap represents a societal threat whenever manipulated
media is released over social networks and consumed by a public
that is ill-equipped to question its authenticity.
For instance, existing technology makes it easier for an actor
to speak a given text, and then change her facial appearance and
voice to imitate those of someone else. Alternatively, the face
of a person captured in a crime-scene can be manipulated and
replaced by another. Both of these examples are referred to as face
swapping. A third scenario involves the reenactment of a person’s
face to change expression or lip motion (aka face reenactment).
Contemporary approaches for detecting such manipulations
relate to these three scenarios similarly: by training a classifier
to distinguish between real and fake images or videos [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12]. We note, however, that the third scenario differs
from the first two, as it does not involve a change in identity.
Our goal is to capture facial manipulation cues caused by face
swapping, where the apparent identity is changed. Application-
wise, swapping is of particular interest, as many of the existing
face manipulation methods are designed for such identity modify-
ing use cases. To this end we make two assumptions: (A1) Facial
manipulation methods only manipulate the internal part of the
face. (A2) The context of the face, which includes the head, neck,
and hair regions outside the internal part of the face, provides a
significant identity signal for the subject.
We verify assumption A2 in Sec. 3.2. Our findings are con-
sistent with previous reports, showing that context alone indeed
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provides strong identity cues [13], [14].
To support assumption A1, Fig. 2 visualizes the affected
regions of six different state of the art facial manipulation methods.
Fig. 2(a,b) present two reenactment methods by Thies et al. [2],
[3]. Both methods manipulate the regions corresponding to a 3D
morphable model (3DMM) [15], [16], covering a facial region
that contains part of the forehead at the top and most of the jaw
on the bottom. Fig. 2(c,d) shows two deepfakes variants samples
from the FaceForensics++ [5] and DFD [1] datasets, both affecting
a square region in the middle of the face. Fig. 2(e) is another
3DMM-based face swapping method, affecting similar regions as
the reenactment methods, excluding the internal part of the mouth
(sample obtained from previous work [5]). Fig. 2(f) is the output
of FSGAN [7] which uses face segmentation to manipulate entire
face regions.
We claim that it is no coincidence that all face manipulation
methods we know of do not affect the entire head: While human
faces have simple, easily modeled geometries, their context (neck,
ears, hair, etc.) are highly irregular and therefore difficult to con-
sistently reconstruct and manipulate, especially when considering
the temporal constraints in video.
We present a novel signal for identifying fake images based
on comparing the inner face region – the one that is directly
manipulated – with its outer context, which is left unaltered by
all face manipulation methods we are aware of. We do this by
representing these two regions, faces and their context, with two
separate identity vectors. The two vectors are obtained by training
two separate face recognition networks: one trained for identifying
a person based on the face region and the other trained to identify
the person based on face context. We compare these two vectors,
seeking identity-to-identify discrepancies.
Importantly, we do not assume prior knowledge of the identity
of the person appearing in the image (source or target subject iden-
tities). Instead, given an image, we compare the representations for
the one or two (unknown) identities, obtained from the face and
its context using our two, specially trained networks.
The cue we derive using these two networks differs from those
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2Fig. 1: Detecting swapped faces by comparing faces and their context. Two example fake (swapped) faces from DFD [1]. Left: The
arm of the eyeglasses does not extend from face to context. Right: An apparent identity mismatch between face and context. We show
how these and similar discrepancies can be used as powerful signals for automatic detection of swapped faces.
Fig. 2: Affected regions of different manipulation methods. (a) + (b) Face2Face [2] and NeuralTextures [3]; (c) + (d) Deepfake [4]
variants of FaceForensics++ [5] and DFD [1]; (e) FaceSwap [6]; (f) FSGAN [7]. In all cases, faces are manipulated but their context is
left unchanged.
obtained by methods that search for artifacts caused by particular
face manipulation techniques. Compared to other methods, our
cue has three distinct advantages: First, our cue is based on the
inherent design of face swap schemes and so is expected to hold
even if future approaches produce photo-realistic, artifact-free
results. Second, this cue generalizes well to different manipulation
methods, whereas artifact detecting methods rely on algorithm-
specific flaws. Finally, since the proposed cue is largely unrelated
to artifact detection methods, it is complementary, and can thus be
readily combined with such approaches to improve accuracy.
To summarize, we make the following contributions: (1) We
propose a novel approach to identifying the results of face swap-
ping methods. (2) Our method is based on a novel fake detection
cue that compares two image-derived identity embeddings. (3) The
proposed approach is shown to outperform existing state-of-the-art
schemes when applied to FaceForensics++ [5], Celeb-DF-v2 [17],
and DFDC [18]. (4) We show further results on two additional
face swapping benchmarks, created using the FaceForensics++
data and additional swapping techniques, not included in Face-
Forensics++.
2 RELATED WORK
Face swapping techniques. Semi- and fully-automatic face swap-
ping methods were introduced nearly two decades ago [19], [20].
These early methods were proposed as a means for preserv-
ing privacy [20], [21], [22], recreation [23], and entertainment
(e.g., [24], [25]); a far cry from some of their less appealing
applications today in misinformation and fake news. Nearly all
pre-deep learning approaches relied to some extent on 3D face
representations, notably 3DMM [15], [16], [26]. Some of the more
recent examples of such methods are the Face2Face approach
for expression transfer [2], face reenactement [27], expression
manipulation [28], [29], [30], and face swapping methods [14].
Public awareness of face manipulation methods began fol-
lowing the introduction of deep learning–based swapping and
reenactment, particularly through the use of generative adversarial
networks (GAN). A few notable examples of such techniques
are GANimation [31], GANnotation [32], and others [33], [34],
[35]. Unlike earlier, 3D-based methods, GAN-based approaches
are able to produce near photo-realistic results, not only in still
photos, but also in videos. The quality of these results, along with
the availability of public software, led to the use of what is now
collectively known as DeepFakes, for undesirable applications,
including porn and fake news. More recently, FSGAN [7] showed
convincing swapping results without requiring a dedicated training
procedure for each source or target person, i.e., it is trained to
replace any face with any other face.
2.1 Detecting manipulated faces
Over the years, many proposed methods for detecting generic,
copy-move and splicing manipulations in images and videos [36],
[37], [38], [39]. Faces, however, received far less attention, likely
because until recently, it was far harder to produce photo-realistic
face manipulations.
The elevated threat posed by recent face manipulation methods
is now being answered by increased efforts to develop automatic
fake detection methods. Early methods for detecting manipulated
visual media relied on handcrafted features [11]. A more mod-
ern, deep learning–based implementation of this approach was
recently described by Cozzolino et al. [10], followed by other
deep learning–based methods, [8], [9], [12], [40], [41], [42], [43],
[44], [45], as well as approaches utilizing multiple cues [39], [46],
[47], [48], [49], [50], [51].
3Sabir et al. [45] recently proposed a recurrent neural network
which uses temporal cues to detect Deepfake manipulations in
videos. Stehouwer et al. [52] applied an attention mechanism
to intermediate feature maps of different backbone classifiers,
to improve manipulated region detection accuracy. Songsri et
al. [53] showed that using additional facial landmarks improves
both detection and localization of Deepfakes. Finally, Nguyen et
al. [48] suggested a fake detection architecture based on the cap-
sule networks. Their work achieves results equivalent to previous
methods, while utilizing significantly fewer parameters.
2.2 Benchmarking face manipulation
A number of recent efforts try to provide the research community
with standard, high quality, fake detection benchmarks. These
efforts include FaceForensics [44], DeepFake-TIMIT [54], Celeb-
DF [17], VTD dataset [55], FaceForensics++ challenge [5], and
the DFD dataset [1]. Several industry research labs have also
recently contributed to these efforts, leading to the announcement
of the DeepFake Detection Challenge (DFDC) [18].
These benchmarks represent multiple manipulation techniques
– not just face swapping. By using a single (or few) synthesis
methods, biases can be inadvertently introduced into these chal-
lenges: artifacts that are unique to a particular fake generation
method, or to the use of particular training data. These sets, there-
fore, include media generated with a variety of synthesis methods.
Our approach is designed to be invariant to such incidental biases:
Rather than seeking particular artifacts, we consider a perceptual
effect shared by swapping techniques in general and show that
our method can detect fakes produced by previously unseen face
manipulation techniques.
3 RECOGNITION OF FACES AND THEIR CONTEXT
We describe the two complementary face recognition networks
used to obtain identity cues for the face and its context. We
further explain how we use these two networks in our proposed
fake detection method. Deep neural networks are extensively used
for face identification, and we focus on the contributions of two
very specific facial regions, dictated by the desired application: the
segmented face and its surrounding context.
3.1 Detecting and segmenting faces
We begin by applying the dual shot face detector (DSFD) [56].
We then increase detected bounding box sizes by 20%, relative
to their height, to expose more of the context around the face, as
DSFD is trained to return tight facial bounding boxes. Face crops
are then resized to 299×299 pixels; the input resolution of the
Xception architecture [57] which we use for our face/context cues
(Sec. 3.2).
To determine which parts of the crop are processed by the
face network and which by the context network, we segment
the crop into foreground (face) and background (context) using
a face segmentation network. The exact architecture and training
details for the segmentation network are provided in Appendix A.
Given the cropped face I and its corresponding face segmentation
mask S, we generate image If and its complementary image Ic,
representing the face and its context, respectively.
Method Train set Validation set
Context 99.90 87.06
Face 99.89 95.10
Entire region 99.98 96.98
TABLE 1: Face recognition accuracy on VGGFace2. Results
reported for three face identification Xception networks, each
applied to a different part of the face. As expected, the entire re-
gion, containing both face and context, is the most accurate. Even
context alone, however, provides a strong cue for identification, as
previously observed by others [13], [14].
3.2 Recognition networks
Recognition network architecture. Our networks are based on
the Xception architecture [57] following its success in detecting
other DeepFake cues [5]. We train the network using a vanilla
cross entropy loss, although other loss functions could presumably
also be used. Xception is based on the Inception architecture [58]
but with Inception modules replaced with depth-wise separable
convolutions. As far as we know, it was never used for face
recognition.
In our implementation, the Xception network consists of a
strided convolution block, followed by twelve depth-wise separa-
ble convolutions blocks with residual connections, except for the
last one. The network is terminated by two depth-wise separable
convolutions, a pooling operation and a fully connected layer.
We train two identification networks: Ef which maps an
image of size 299x299 containing pixels from the face region
to a vector of pseudo-probabilities associated with the dataset
faces, and, similarly, network Ec maps the remaining pixels from
the detection bounding box (the context) to a vector of pseudo-
probabilities of the same classes.
We train both Ef and Ec on images from the standard,
publicly available VGGFace2 dataset [59]. VGGFace2 contains
9,131 subjects from which we filtered images with a resolution
lower than 128x128, resulting in 8,631 identities. The output of
these two networks is, therefore, in R8,631.
Validating recognition capabilities. To validate and compare the
recognition accuracy of these networks, we test their performance
on both the VGGFace2 [59] test set and the test set of the Labeled
Faces in the Wild (LFW) [60] benchmark (no additional training
or fine tuning was applied to the networks before being tested on
LFW images).
Unsurprisingly, addressing the internal appearance of the face,
network Ef outperforms Ec in term of accuracy, though both
accuracies are high. These results are evident from Table 1 for
VGGFace2 and Fig. 3 for LFW. We note that the accuracy
demonstrated by Ec – its ability to recognize faces despite only
seeing the context – is unsurprising: similar results were reported
by others, showing that faces can be recognized, even when only
their context is visible [13], [14].
Importantly, Fig. 3(b) shows that the representations typically
used for face recognition – the activations of the penultimate layer
of the face recognition network, do not match well for the same
person, since the two networks were trained independently. When
combining the responses from these two networks, we, there-
fore, use their final output: the per-subject pseudo-probabilities
(Sec. 4.1).
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Fig. 3: LFW verification accuracy for identification networks trained on different face regions. (a) Results obtained by representing
faces with the final layers of the Xception architectures. (b) Faces represented using the activations of the penultimate layers of Xception.
In the latter case, face vs. context do not match well for the same person, since the two networks were trained independently. Our
approach, therefore, uses the final layers of the networks, representing subject pseudo-probabilities, when comparing the two (top).
Fig. 4: Method overview. Following initial preprocessing, we obtain regions for the face, If , and its context, Ic. The two are processed
by the face identification networks, Ef and Ec, respectively. A separate network, Es, considers the input image, I , seeking apparent
swapping artifacts to decides if it is a face swapping result. The pseudo-probability vectors of the two face identification networks are
subtracted and, jointly with the representations obtained from the method type network, Es, are passed to the final classifier, D.
4 FAKE DETECTION USING FACES VS. CONTEXT
We illustrate our proposed fake detection approach in Fig. 4. Our
method combines multiple Xception networks: The recognition
networks, Ef and Ec, described in Sec. 3, a binary Xception net,
Es, trained to distinguish between real and manipulated images
by face swapping methods, and another, optional, binary Xception
net, Er (not shown in Fig. 4), which we train to differentiate real
images from those manipulated by face reenactment methods. We
next describe these components in detail.
4.1 Face discrepancy component
We train the face discrepancy network to predict whether a face
and its context share the same identity. It uses the output of the
two recognition networks, Ef and Ec, described in Sec. 3. We
pre-train these two networks and do not change their weights
after they are combined, in order to ensure that the identity cues
remain the dominant ones. In Sec. 5.3 we show that training with
the recognition network’s weights unfrozen leads to a reduced
accuracy when generalizing to unseen methods.
We process the face and context images, If and Ic, with two
separate identity classifiers, Ef and Ec, respectively, to compute
a discrepancy feature vector vd
vd = Ef (If )− Ec(Ic) = vf − vc. (1)
4.2 Manipulation specific networks
Previous approaches trained classifiers to distinguish between real
and fake faces, without considering the particular manipulation
applied to the faces – swapping or reenactment. These two
manipulations types differ significantly: Swapping manipulates the
5identity of the face, whereas reenactment manipulates facial pose
and expression. While the latter is not the focus of our work, it
is required by the FaceForensics++ benchmark used in our tests
(Sec. 5.2). Our approach, therefore, includes also a component for
detecting face reenactment.
Specifically, we decouple swapping and reenactment by train-
ing a separate, dedicated classifier for each: Network Es is
trained to detect swapping artifacts and network Er (not shown
in Fig. 4) is trained to detect reenactment. We use Xception
networks, similar to those described in Sec. 3.2 for recognition,
and train these networks to classify genuine vs. manipulated. Our
training process first pre-trains both networks on examples of
their particular manipulation vs. pristine images. Our reenactment
network, Er, is used in cases where the task is to detect both
face swapping and face reenactment methods. Otherwise, we use
a three network solution, where Er is omitted.
4.3 Combining all detection cues
We chose the simplest method for combining the various signals:
concatenating the three vectors vd, vs and vr , where vd ∈ R8,631
is defined in Eq. (1), and vs = Eps (I) and vr = E
p
r (I), both
in R2,048, denote the activations of the penultimate layers of the
binary Es and Er , respectively.
The concatenated vector is passed to classifier D, which
outputs a real vs. fake binary signal, trained using a logistic
loss function. The classifier D consists of an initial linear layer,
followed by batch normalization, ReLU, and a final linear layer.
4.4 Training
We first pre-train the four classifiers, Es, Er , Ef , and Ec,
each on its own task. We train network Es on the subset of
videos in FaceForensics++ [5] consisting of pristine videos and
videos manipulated by the face swapping methods: FaceSwap
and Deepfakes. Network Er is trained on the face reenactment
methods: Face2Face and NeuralTextures. Note that we only use
the compressed versions of these videos for training, with C23
(HQ) and C40 (LQ) compressions. We chose not to use the raw
videos for training because there is little difference between them
and the C23 compressed videos. The FaceForensics++ benchmark
used to test our method does contain all three versions. The
training process applied to Ef and Ec is detailed in Sec. 3.
Once the four networks are trained, we freeze the weights of
Ef and Ec, and train the final classification network, D, using
the three output vectors (vs, vr, vd), while only fine-tuning Er
and Es. The final training is done on the same split of the
FaceForensics++ videos. For more technical details, please see
Appendix B.
4.5 Inference on full images
During inference, we often process images containing multiple
faces. In such cases, we only classify detected faces having a
height larger than 64 pixels, and discard the rest as background
faces. The only exceptions are images where the largest face does
not comply with this criterion, in which case we process the largest
detected face.
We further remove false detections by applying a threshold on
the number of face pixels in the face segmentation mask, S, for
each detection. We start with a threshold of 15% of the face pixels,
relative to the number of pixels in the cropped region. If this step
filters-out all our detections, we reduce the threshold by half. If
none of the images pass the 7.5% threshold, we simply consider
the one face patch with the maximal number of detected pixels.
Finally, we apply the compound network, including
Em, Ef , Ec, and D, to the remaining face patches (one or more)
and obtain one score per face patch as the output ofD. We take the
minimal output of these scores – the face patch predicted as most
likely to be fake – in cases where only a single face is manipulated.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluated our proposed scheme using three recent, challenging
benchmarks: FaceForensics++ [5], DFDC [18], and Celeb-DF-
v2 [17]. In order to evaluate our method using additional face
swapping techniques and test its generalization abilities, we fur-
ther create our own test set, using two more swapping methods.
For a runtime analysis of our method, please see Appendix C.
5.1 Face swapping detection experiments
We use the following three datasets containing only face swapping
examples:
FF-DF. FF-DF [17] is a subset of the FaceForensics++ bench-
mark [5], which includes only faces swapped using the Deepfakes
method [4]. These tests therefore include 1,000 videos from the
pristine subset and 1,000 videos from the Deepfakes subset (the
full FaceForensics++ is described in Sec. 5.2).
DFDC. The recently announced, industry-backed, preview of the
DFDC benchmark [18] offers a total of 5,244 videos of 66 actors:
4,464 training videos and 780 test videos, 1,131 of them are real
videos and 4,113 are fakes generated by two different, unknown,
face swapping methods.
Celeb-DF-v2. Another recent dataset containing 590 real videos
and 5,639 DeepFake videos of 59 celebrities [17]. This set is
especially challenging as most state of the art methods tested on
this set report near-chance accuracies.
Training and evaluation. In these tests, we do not use our
reenactment network, Er . We train on FaceForensics++, as de-
scribed in Sec. 3. Results for all baseline methods were previously
reported [17]. These methods were trained mainly on FaceForen-
sics++, sometimes with additional self collected data. None of
these methods was trained on DFDC or Celeb-DF-v2 and so
these experiments also compare the generalization of the different
methods.
All methods were compared using the area under the curve
(AUC), at the frame level, on all frames in which faces were
detected. This metric is very convenient for comparing methods
that output per-frame classification as there is no need to set
thresholds.
Face swap detection results. We report our results in Table 2.
Our method achieves the best AUC scores on all the benchmarks.
On FaceForensics’s DeepFakes subset [5] our method achieves
similar results as the current state of the art, this is due to
the accuracy being saturated. On the more challenging Celeb-
DF-v2 benchmark, small improvements on the AUC scores are
significant. Note also that the results reported for our method
on Celeb-DF-v2 testify to its improved generalization abilities
compared to the baseline methods.
6Methods FF-DF Celeb-DF-v2
Two-stream [51] 70.1 53.8
Meso4 [8] 84.7 54.8
MesoInception4 [8] 83.0 53.6
HeadPose [50] 47.3 54.6
FWA [42] 80.1 56.9
DSP-FWA [42] 93.0 64.0
VA-MLP [46] 66.4 55.0
VA-LogReg [46] 78.0 55.1
XceptionNet-raw [5] 99.7 48.2
XceptionNet-c23 [5] 99.7 65.3
XceptionNet-c40 [5] 95.5 65.5
Multi-task [61] 76.3 54.3
Capsule [48] 96.6 57.5
Ours 99.7 66.0
TABLE 2: Face swap detection results. Comparison of our
approach and leading state of the art methods on two benchmarks
using frame-level AUC (%).
Methods DF F2F FS NT Pristine Total
Steg. Features [11] 73.6 73.7 68.9 63.3 34.0 51.8
Cozzolino et al. [10] 85.4 67.8 73.7 78.0 34.4 55.2
Rahmouni et al. [12] 85.4 64.2 56.3 60.0 50.0 58.1
Bayar and Stamm [9] 84.5 73.7 82.5 70.6 46.2 61.6
MesoNet [8] 87.2 56.2 61.1 40.6 72.6 66.0
Xception [5] 96.3 86.8 90.3 80.7 52.4 71.0
Ours 94.5 80.3 84.5 74.0 67.6 75.0
TABLE 3: FaceForensics++ image benchmark results. Columns
are: DeepFakes (DF), Face2Face (F2F), FaceSwap (FS), Neu-
ralTextures (NT), and Pristine categories. It is hard to compare
specific columns, since there is a threshold-based trade-off be-
tween real and fake. These columns are therefore provided only
for completeness. Our method leads in the Total score, which is
the meaningful metric for this benchmark.
5.2 Experiments on FaceForensics++
The full FaceForensics++ dataset [5] contains 1,000 videos ob-
tained from the web, from which 1,000 video pairs were randomly
selected and used to generate additional 1,000 manipulated videos
representing four face manipulation schemes. Two of these meth-
ods perform face swapping: a 3D-based face swapping method [6]
using a traditional graphics pipeline and blending, and a GAN-
based method [4], trained using the images of pairs of subjects
to compute a mapping between them. Two additional methods
perform face reenactment: Face2Face [2], a 3DMM-based method
that manipulates facial expressions by changing the expression-
coefficients estimated for the face, and NeuralTextures [3] which
learns a face neural texture from a video and uses it to realistically
render a 3D reconstructed face model.
Results on FaceForensics++ image benchmark. Table 3 shows
that our total accuracy outperforms all previous methods by a
large margin. Importantly, the accuracy in each of the different
categories, on its own, is not a direct indication of detection per-
formance, since there is a threshold-dependent trade-off between
the accuracy on real and fake images. These results hint at the
relative detection difficulty of each class and are provided for
completeness.
3D-based swap FSGAN
Methods Fake Real Total Fake Real Total
Face identity difference 47.33 77.66 62.50 34.66 80.50 57.58
Binary XceptionNet [10] 55.38 97.72 76.55 24.80 94.68 59.74
Ours (end-to-end) 54.74 97.70 76.22 31.66 95.38 63.52
Ours 68.20 95.10 81.65 47.14 90.56 68.85
Face identity difference 60.20 66.12 63.16 38.96 77.50 58.23
Binary XceptionNet [10] 89.03 81.36 85.20 73.92 64.04 68.98
Ours (end-to-end) 90.77 83.54 87.16 79.58 71.40 75.49
Ours 90.52 88.20 89.36 78.72 71.66 75.19
TABLE 4: Generalization results. Top: Results with a fixed
threshold at zero. Bottom: Upper bound results, obtained with
a fixed threshold maximizing total accuracy on the test set. See
Sec. 5.3 for more details.
5.3 Ablation study and generalization experiment
Face manipulation methods sometimes leave behind artifacts, pos-
sibly imperceptible, that can be leveraged for detection. Different
manipulation methods, however, can produce different artifacts,
as shown in Fig. 5. There is, therefore, no guarantee that a fake
detection method would perform well when presented with fakes
generated by unseen schemes which do not leave such known,
recognizable artifacts. We next verify the accuracy of our proposed
scheme in detecting fakes produced by methods that were not part
of its training set.
We conduct these tests by extending the FaceForensics++ set,
applying two additional face swapping methods to its videos: (1)
Our implementation of FSGAN [7] and (2) the publicly available
implementation of Nirkin et al. [14], a 3D-based face swapping
method that uses single image 3D face reconstruction and seg-
mentation. Examples of the four face swapping methods, using
the same source and target, can be seen in Fig. 5. Each method
generates face swaps with distinct artifacts, with the exception of
FSGAN, which produces images with fewer apparent artifacts.
The extended version of the benchmark follows the pair selec-
tions prescribed by the original FaceForensics++ dataset. Because
Nirkin et al. [14] was designed for image-to-image face swapping,
for each frame in the target video we select its closest frame in the
source video, in terms of estimated head pose.
In all our generalization experiments, we train the variants of
our method and its XceptionNet baseline on the pristine and face
swapping manipulations, using the official training and validation
subsets of FaceForensics++. In these experiments, we do not use
the reenactment detection network Er.
5.3.1 Generalization and ablation results
We studied the effect of our face vs. context discrepancy approach
by comparing it to a naive classifier. We further test an end-to-end
version of our method, where all the classifiers are unfrozen in the
training process. We report our generalization results in Table 4
(ROC curves provided in Fig. 6). For results appearing at the top
of Table 4, we fix the thresholds for XceptionNet and our method
at zero. In the bottom of Table 4 we optimize both thresholds on
the test set. The threshold of the face identity difference in the first
experiment is optimized using the VGGFace2 test set.
Our results show that our method significantly outperforms
the baseline on both unseen methods. The performance gap is
greater on FSGAN generated faces, where artifacts are more rare.
Artifacts produced by the 3DMM-based method are more similar
to the ones we encounter in other methods, and so the gap is
smaller. As evident from the ROC curves in Fig. 6, the end-to-end
version of our method is less able to generalize. This result is due
7Fig. 5: Extending FaceForensics++ with unseen methods. Examples shown for the same source / target face pair, using the 3D-based
methods, FaceSwap [6] and Nirkin et al. [14], and the GAN-based methods, Deepfakes [4] and FSGAN [7]. Despite using the same
image pairs in all four examples, the results are different, each exhibiting its own artifacts.
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Fig. 6: Results on our two variations of FaceForensics++ videos. (a) Generalization results with FSGAN generated swaps [7]. (b)
Generalization results with swaps generated by Nirkin et al. [14]. See Sec. 5.3 for more details.
to the end-to-end training process sullying the face and context
classifiers roles for extracting aligned identity representations.
Finally, note that the face discrepancy signal by itself is not
competitive with networks trained to detect fakes. However, it is
indicative of fake videos and its contribution to the overall method
is seen by comparing our method with the baseline XceptionNet.
5.4 Qualitative results
Fig. 7 presents qualitative examples of detected and missed fake
faces from the DFDC collection. Fig. 7(a) shows example fakes
detected by our method but undetected by the state of the art
XceptionNet fake detector [57]. Fig. 7(b) offers example fakes
which were detected by XceptionNet, but were missed by our
method. Finally, Fig. 7(c) shows fakes missed by both approaches.
Clearly, our method excels in cases where swapping artifacts
are hard to detect (Fig. 7(a)). Examining Fig. 7(b) shows that fake
images detected by XceptionNet often exhibit visible artifacts,
which that method was optimized to detect. Our method includes a
face swapping component, Es (Sec. 4.2), trained to detect similar
method-specific artifacts, but does not provide the same detection
accuracy as the baseline when such artifacts are present. Our
overall approach still outperforms the baseline by a wide margin,
as reported in Sec. 5.1 and 5.2. Finally, the fakes missed by both
methods are typically challenging images with low contrast or
blurry features as in Fig. 7(c).
6 CONCLUSION
While the ability to manipulate faces in images and video has
increased dramatically in the last few years, all recent methods
follow similar patterns. In this work, we propose a novel detection
cue which utilizes the commonalities of all recent face iden-
tity manipulation methods. It is complementary to conventional
real/fake classifiers and can be used alongside them. Overcoming
this approach would require a much broader integration of the
new identity into the image, making our contribution hard to
circumvent without additional technological breakthroughs. This
is in contrast to artifact detection methods, which are susceptible
to the constant progress in the visual quality of generated images.
It is our hope that by further analyzing the design principles
of face swapping techniques, additional methods of identifying
fake images and videos would be discovered, leading to effective
mitigation of the societal risks of such media.
8Fig. 7: Qualitative detection results. Examples taken from the DFDC collection. (a) Fakes detected by our method, but undetected by
a leading baseline, XceptionNet fake detector [57]. (b) Fakes detected by XceptionNet but missed by our approach. (c) Fakes missed
by both methods. See Sec. 5.4 for more details.
APPENDIX A
SEGMENTATION NETWORK DETAILS
For the face segmentation network, we are using the U-Net [62]
architecture where the deconvolution layers used for the upsam-
pling operations replaced with bilinear interpolation followed by
a convolution. For this network, we crop and resize the images to
a resolution of 256x256.
The network is trained on a face segmentation dataset, similar
to the one used by Nirkin el al. [14], and produced by us using
their publicly available code1. Training used a batch size of 48
and 40,000 iterations per epoch. To increase the robustness of
the segmentation network, the following image augmentations
are applied: random image rotations between -30 to 30 degrees,
random color jittering (brightness, contrast, saturation, and hue),
horizontal flip with probability 0.5, and gaussian blur with a kernel
size of 5 and sigma of 1.1, which is applied with probability 0.5.
APPENDIX B
TRAINING DETAILS
Training used four NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPUs and an Intel Xeon
CPU with 64 cores. We applied Adam optimization [63] (β1 =
0.5, β2 = 0.999). The learning rate was reduced by half every ten
epochs, for a total of 90 epochs. The initial learning rate and the
batch size differ between the training stages (see below).
Identity networks. The identity networks, Ef and Ec, are trained
on images from the VGGFace2 dataset [59], cropped by the
provided bounding boxes after they have been squared using the
length of the longer of the two axes and their size extended
by 20%. The cropped images are then resized to a resolution
of 299x299, which is the required input size for the Xception
architecture [57]. As a form of augmentation, the images are
horizontally flipped with a probability of 0.5. For the face network,
1. Available: https://github.com/YuvalNirkin/face video segment
Ef , we set the context pixels to a constant color, and for the
context network, Ec, we set pixels corresponding to the face
regions to a constant color. Both networks are trained with a batch
size of 192 and an initial learning rate of 0.0002.
Pretraining of the manipulation specific networks. Networks
Es and Er , are trained on the videos of FaceForensics++ [5], each
on its own specific subset as described in Sec. 4.4 in the main
paper. The networks are trained for 40,000 iteration per epoch,
with a batch size of 96, and an initial learning rate of 0.0002. For
each iteration a random frame from a random video is selected,
for which a face was detected. The face crops are transformed in
the same way as for the identity networks.
Training of the full pipeline. In this final training, the networks
Es, Er , and D are trained, while the weights of the identity net-
works, Ef and Ec, are frozen (except for the end-to-end ablation
experiment, see Sec. 5.3 in the main paper). The discriminator D
is trained from scratch, its weights are randomly initialized using a
normal distribution. A batch size of 64 is used and there are 20,000
iterations per epoch. The initial learning rate is set to 0.0001.
APPENDIX C
RUNTIME PERFORMANCE
The system runtime performance was tested on a single NVIDIA
Tesla V100 GPU with an Intel Xeon CPU with 8 cores. The entire
pipeline was tested, including the segmentation and preprocessing
but without the face detection step. For face detection we are using
the dual shot face detector (DSFD) [56] which was not optimized
for run-time performance and was originally used for images and
not videos. This detection step can potentially be replaced with
a face tracking algorithm (many of which can run in real-time
even on CPU [64]). Our full pipeline inference rate without the
reenactment classifier, Er , is fast, at 90.6fps. Runtime is 81.5fps
with Er .
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